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employees' performance grow as the firm's
work force expands. Keeley argues thattwo
ways largefirms tryto keep monitoringcosts
under control is to hirehigh-productivity
workers and to provide large amounts of
specific, on-the-job training forthem. Ifhis
argument were correct, employees in larger"
firms should be observed to earn more 00"
average than workers in smallerfirms
because oftheir higher productivity. Atthe
same time, the relatively large amounts
invested in specific training by larger firms
should mean lower layoff and quit rates for
their labor force.
Money Demand
In a short policy article, "Dynamic Adjust-
ment in Money Demand," Brian Motley
looks at two competing specifications of
how money demand behaves in the short-
run. The first, contained in conventional, or
money-adjustment, models specifies that
These findings bear on contemporary anti-
trust law and regulatory practices that
discourage large-scale firms in some indus-
tries. Keeley argues that these actions may
be counterproductive because they may
prevent firms from fully utilizingtheir
managerial resources to obtain maximum
efficiency. Consequently, he concludes,
"...there may be economiclosses associated"
with public policies that prohibit firms from
attaining theiroptimum size."
Keeley finds evidence for both ofthese
implications in a survey ofhouseholds and
employersdone in 1979-1980forthe federal
government's Employment Opportunity
PilotProject. Hefindsthatlarge firms pay 10
to 15 percent more on average to their
employees, even after correctingfor
demographic differences, occupation,
union status and other variables. Moreover,
data from the survey also indicates signif-
icantly loweremployee turnover rates in
larger firms.
Economics of Firm Size
Four articles appear in the Winter, 1984
Economic Review, covering awide range of
topics. In the firstarticle, "TheEconomicsof
Firm Size," Michael Keeley looks at the
question ofwhyfirmsofwidelyvarying sizes
coexist in many industries, aquestion that
has important implications for regulatory
and antitrust policy. Conventional neo-
classical price theory does not shed much
light on this question because its usual
assumptions ofcompetitive behavior and
identical production technologies lead to
the prediction that all firms will be the same
size in an industry.
As Keeley notes, however, there are limitsto
the size ofafirm because costs ofmonitoring
Recent research on the economics offirm
size finds an explanation in differences
in managerial ability. According to this
work, even small differences in managerial'
talent can have large effects on a firm's
overall productivity because ofthe highly
hierarchical structure ofthe modern day
enterprise. Firms with superior managerial
talent therefore can become large and still
remain efficient by reason oftheir increased
productivity.
Firm Size, Exchange Rates, and Interest Rates
This Weekly Letter inaugurates anewseries,
appearingoncea quarter, ofdigests of
articles appearing in the Federal Reserve
Bank ofSan Francisco's quarterly Economic
Review. These digests are intended to make
available to a wider audience the major
findings ofresearch conductedatthe San
Francisco Bank. Readers ofthe Weekly who
wish to obtain individualcopies ofa Review,
orwho would like to be placedon the Re-
view mailing list, may do so bywriting the
Public Information Department, P.O. Box
7702, San Francisco 94720. In the case
where you are interested in a particular
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the public adjusts the quantity of money it
holdswithalag to changes in desired levels.
The alternative explanation, which has
received increasing attention in the past few
years, is based on the idea that the central
bank can in principle determine the total
amount ofmoney in circulation (the supply
ofmoney) independent ofthe public's
demand for it in the short run. Over longer
periods oftime, the economy will adjust
interest rates, prices and incometobringthe
desired quantityofmoneybalances into line
with the existing supply.
Motley compares the performance of a
variant ofthis supply-determined model-
one in which prices adjust to bring money
demandandsupply into balance--,-with the
money-adjustment specification in the
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco's
money-market model. (As Motley notes in
his introduction, the San Francisco specifi-
cCltion, with its emphasis on the important
"bufferstock" role money plays, falls
somewhere between the conventional and
alternative specifications.) Using monthly
data for the period 1976-1983, Motleycon-
cludes thatthere is some evidence in favorof
the money-adjustment model, although
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"the evidence is notstrong eitherway."
Motley also notes thatthe price-adjustment
model's poor performance for the period
after October 6, 1979 raises the question of
whether the Fed's switch to a new operating
procedure then was really the "monetarist
experiment" many claimed itto be.
Intervention: Japan's ease
Whether and how central banks should
intervene in foreign exchangemarkets to
stabilize their currencies has been a subject
ofwide debate in recent years and a major
topic in the economic summits ofVersailles
and Williamsburg in 1982 and 1983.
Michael Hutchison, in his article "Inter-
vention, Deficit Finance and Real Exchange
Rates: The Case ofJapan," studies the effec-
tiYE;,IlE;;Sli pfso-ci1!leq :'st~rili,?:ed"intery~n,~; ...
tion in the foreign exchangemarkets.
Sterilized intervention means that any
effects of intervention on the domestic
money stock are offset. Sterilized inter-
vention therefore affects the exchange rate
onlythrough its impactonthe mixofforeign
and domestic bonds in private portfolios.
Differentportfoliocompositions in principle
affect the relative yields on domestic and
foreign bonds, which in turn causes
exchange rates to adjust. However, as
Hutchison argues, government deficits also
alter the mixofforeign and domestic secur-
ities as new domestic bonds are issued, and
therefore may offset the effectofexchange
rate intervention.
Hutchison's examination of the Japanese-
U.S. exchange rate during the period
1973-82 suggests that sterilized interventionby the Bank ofJapan has "had only asmall
influence on the yen-dollar real exchange
rate" and that this influence has been
swamped by the impactofgovernment
deficits. Moreover, Hutchison concludes,
"itappears likely that sterilized intervention
will become an even less potent policy
instrument as the Japanese financial system
becomes more closely integrated with its
western counterparts."
Indicators of Real Interest Rates
Modern economic theory emphasizes that
nominal, or market, rates of interest have
two components: an inflation premium to
protect lenders against expected future
inflation, and a real, or inflation-adjusted,
componentthat measuresthe true cost tothe
borrower. As Charles Pigott points out in his
article, "Indicators ofLong-Term Real
Interest Rates," each ofthese components is
ofconcern to the policy-maker, butunfor-
tunately, neither can be observed directly.
This makes itparticularly difficultto
interpret movements in longer term rates.
Pigott's strategy for determining which
component is changing when market rates
move is to lookatsome economicindicators
that are affected either by real interest rates,
or by expected inflation-but not by both.
Oneofthe real rate indicators Pigott uses is
the real exchange rate-the nominal ex-
change rate deflated by the ratio ofthe
foreign to the u.s. price level. A rise in the
real exchange rate is caused, among other
things, by a rise in U.s. longer term real
rates. Thus, all other things beingequal,
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an observed rise in both u.s. nominal rates
and the real exchange rate would indicate
that real u.S. rates had risen. On the other
hand, concurrent movements in nominal
interest rates and forward exchange rates-
an indicatorofexpected inflation-would
be evidence that inflation expectations
had changed.
Pigott applies this methodology to the
behavior ofthe dollar-German mark
exchange rate and U.S. and German longer
term interest rates over the period 1976-
1983 in a search for clues aboutwhat
happened to real interest rates and inflation
expectations in the U.S. duringthattime. His
findings corroborate impressions from other
sourcesthattherewas "asubstantial decline
in.expected...inflation over\qeJastse.veral
years" but that at the same time "real inter-
est rates have remained very high in
comparison to their level prior to 1979."
Despite some practical difficulties in imple-
menting his methodology, Pigottconcludes
that itoffers a potentiallyfruitful wayofex-
tracting information from foreign exchange
and other financial markets to understand
the likely sources and potential impacts of
variations in domestic interest rates.SSV1::> .lSl::Il::I
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 179,691 - 375 3,666 5.6
Loans and Leases1 6 159,987 - 393 4,632 8.1
Commercial and Industrial 48,421 320 2,458 14.6
Real estate 59,720 29 821 3.8
Loans to Individuals 27,906 - 34 1,255 12.8
Leases 5,013 13 - 50 - 2.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,106 36 - 401 - 8.7
Other Securities2 7,598 - 18 - 565 - 18.9
Total Deposits 185,545 - 2,311 - 5,452 - 7.8
DemandDeposits 43,257 -2,969 - 5,980 - 33.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,173 63 - 2,158 ' - 18.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 . 12,296 99 - 479 - 10.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 129,992 559 1,007 2.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts~Total 39,370 62 - 277 - 1.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$lQO,OOO or more 38,773 292 608 4.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed Moneys. 21,192 660 - 815 - 9.6
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position,All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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